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Altruism (a costly action that benefits others) and reciprocity (the repayment of acts
in kind) differ in that the former expresses preferences about the outcome of a
social interaction, whereas the latter requires, in addition, ascribing intentions to
others. Interestingly, an individual’s behavior and neurophysiological activity under
outcome- versus intention-based interactions has not been compared directly using
different endowments in the same subject and during the same session. Here, we
used a mixed version of the Dictator and the Investment games, together with
electroencephalography, to uncover a subject’s behavior and brain activity when
challenged with endowments of different sizes in contexts that call for an altruistic
(outcome-based) versus a reciprocal (intention-based) response. We found that subjects
displayed positive or negative reciprocity (reciprocal responses greater or smaller
than that for altruism, respectively) depending on the amount of trust they received.
Furthermore, a subject’s late frontal negativity differed between conditions, predicting
responses to trust in intentions-based trials. Finally, brain regions related with mentalizing
and cognitive control were the cortical sources of this activity. Thus, our work
disentangles the behavioral components present in the repayment of trust, and sheds
light on the neural activity underlying the integration of outcomes and perceived
intentions in human economic interactions.
Keywords: altruism, anterior cingulate cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, event-related potentials, positive
and negative reciprocity, temporoparietal junction, theory of mind
INTRODUCTION
Due to their pervasiveness and functional importance in economic and social life, relations of
trust have become an important research topic in the social sciences during the last decades,
from sociology (Coleman, 2000; Cook and Santana, 2020) to economics (Dasgupta, 1988) and
political sciences (Putnam et al., 1994; Putnam, 2000) to psychology (Dunning and Fetchenhauer,
2011). Situations involving trust constitute a subclass of those involving risk, in which the risk the
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trustor (voluntarily) takes depends on the response from the
trustee, the party in which trust is placed (Coleman, 2000).
The use of game theoretical experimental paradigms, which
reproduce the features of situations involving trust, have
produced a new wave of empirical research that aids in our
understanding of the determinants of both trusting behavior
(on the role of the trustor) and trustworthy behavior (on the
side of the trustee). A well-known experimental paradigm that
stylizes these situations is the Trust game (TG; Camerer, 2003).
In a TG, the trustor faces a binary choice to either trust or
distrust the trustee; and the trustee—if trusted—also faces a
binary choice to either honor this trust (case in which both the
trustor and the trustee see their situation improved relative to
the distrust scenario), or to abuse this trust. If trust is placed
by the trustor and abused by the trustee, the trustee obtains a
higher payo  than when he honors this trust, but the trustor
sees his position impoverished with respect to the status quo
(i.e., distrust). Similarly, in the Investment game (IG; Berg
et al., 1995), the trustor receives a monetary endowment and
decides how much of this endowment will be “invested” in the
trustee. This investment is usually first tripled before being sent
to the trustee, who now decides—after observing the trustor’s
allocation—the amount of money that she/he will send back to
the trustor. Thus, the IG provides behavioral measures of trust—
the level of investment by the trustor—and trustworthiness—the
repayment by the trustee (Camerer, 2003). Experimental studies
of trust games have recently been informed by the field of social
neuroscience and its enquiries into the neurobiological correlates
of behavior occurring during these games.
Whereas most studies focus on the behavioral and
neurobiological correlates of trusting behavior (see, for instance,
Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008, 2011), here we
focus on the trustee’s response, and thus on the behavioral
determinants of trustworthiness and its neurobiological
correlates. In the IG, specifically, trusting behavior has been
mostly associated with expectations about trustworthiness
(Ashraf et al., 2006) and betrayal aversion (Camerer, 2003).
On the other hand, trustworthy behavior has been mostly
associated with other-regarding behaviors (Fehr, 2009). Other-
regarding behavior may be related to the outcomes of the
game or to the intentions inferred by the trustee from the
trustor’s actions (McCabe et al., 2003). Outcome-based behavior
could take the form of altruism—i.e., a costly unconditional
act that benefits another individual (Wilson, 1975; Levine,
1998)—or inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 2001). It is important to stress that neither
altruism nor inequity aversion depend on the intentions
ascribed by the trustee to the trustor and, therefore, should
not be influenced by the investment allocated by the trustor.
Intention-based behavior, on the other hand, takes the form
of reciprocity, the disposition to spend resources to reward
favorable treatment or to sanction unfavorable treatment
(Gouldner, 1960; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).
When the trustor’s decision is binary, there is no ambiguity:
Trust is a favorable act toward the trustee, and distrust is an
unfavorable one. However, in the context of the IG, whether
positive or negative reciprocity will influence the trustee’s
decision will depend on whether she/he evaluates the level
of investment as trust or distrust. Thus, the trustee might
consider that only investments above a given threshold should
be considered trust. If positive reciprocity (an intention-based
behavior) is influencing the trustee’s behavior, the amount sent
back by the trustee should be higher than the amount she/he
would send if only altruism and inequity aversion (outcome-
based behaviors) were influencing the trustee’s decision. In
contrast, the amount sent back should be lower when negative
reciprocity has been triggered.
Insights from neurocognitive studies have not disentangled
intention- from outcome-based behaviors. Reports using the
TG have shown that the mentalizing system—mainly the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Frith and Frith, 1999; Decety and
Lamm, 2007; Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011)—is activated
when a trustee reciprocates a trustor’s risky allocation (van den
Bos et al., 2009). The TPJ has also been shown to be important
in the control of selfish impulses (Hutcherson et al., 2015). The
cognitive control system, which is crucial for the inhibition of
selfishness, and for strategic and normative decision-making,
may also be involved since the anterior cingulate (ACC; Delgado
et al., 2005; van den Bos et al., 2009; Shenhav et al., 2013) and
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC; Baumgartner et al.,
2011; Chang et al., 2011; Yamagishi et al., 2016) show increased
activity when trustees repay trust with an amount that is smaller
or greater than what they think the trustor expects to be repaid,
respectively (Chang et al., 2011). However, both the mentalizing
and the cognitive control networks are also involved under
outcome-based conditions: The activity of the right TPJ correlates
with how subjects value the outcomes of others (Hutcherson
et al., 2015), whereas the connectivity between the ACC and the
anterior insula predicts empathy-driven (outcomes-based) versus
reciprocity-driven (intentions-based) altruism (Hein et al., 2016).
Electrophysiologically, the frontomedial negativity (FMN), a
family of event-related potential (ERP) deflections classically
related to performance monitoring (Holroyd and Coles, 2002)—
and whose source is the medial prefrontal cortex (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Billeke et al., 2013; Cavanagh and Frank, 2014;
Ullsperger et al., 2014)—is more pronounced when subjects
receive an unfair versus a fair allocation (but specifically when
a friend is playing the role of dictator; Wu et al., 2011).
Importantly, to date no studies have used the greater temporal
resolution of EEG to disentangle intention- and outcome-based
neural activity.
In order to disentangle the influence of outcome-
based preferences and intention-based preferences,
and its neurobiological correlates, we used a mixed
“Dictator/Investment” game (DIG), which uses, in the same
session, both the IG and DG (based on Cox, 2004; see also Ashraf
et al., 2006). This setup allowed us to compare a subject’s ERPs
activity (i) when they received an amount from a human trustor
(IG condition), versus (ii) when they received the same amount
from a computer (DG condition). Under the IG condition, the
decision to repay trust by the trustee was preceded by investment
decisions by the trustor (an actual person) and thus could be
the result not only of outcome-based behavior (altruism or
inequity aversion), but also intention-based behavior (positive or
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negative reciprocity). In contrast, under the DG condition, the
(same) endowment to be allocated by the trustee comes from a
computer, and thus can only be associated with outcome-based
behavior, because is independent from the intentions of the
trustor. In addition, we compared the subsequent allocation
that subjects made under both scenarios, and measured their
EEG activity in the time windows where subjects were notified
about the amount of money they were endowed. Our results
showed that reciprocity actually consisted of positive and
negative reciprocity, for high versus low amounts of received
trust, respectively. At the neural level, a late frontomedial
negativity was more prominent in outcome-based trials, whereas
in intentions-based trials it predicted how subjects responded
to trust. Interestingly, the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortices and the left temporoparietal junction were the sources
of this neurophysiological activity. In summary, our work
disentangles the di erent behavioral components underlying the
repayment of trust, and implicates brain networks involved in
mentalizing and cognitive control in the process of integrating




Twenty right-handed undergraduate students (mean
age = 21.2 years; s.d. = 2.07 years; min = 18 years; max = 25 years;
45% women) participated in the experiment. Participants were
instructed to abstain from exercise, ca eine, and alcohol, starting
the night before the sessions. Subjects with chronic diseases,
mental disorders, medication, or those who abused drugs, were
excluded. All subjects approved and signed a written informed
consent form. They then read written and listened to verbal
instructions explaining the task. Finally, they answered a 7 item
questionnaire, to ensure that they had understood the logic
of the game. All participants answered all questions correctly.
The main experiments were carried out in the EEG Lab of the
Neuroscience Area of the Scuola Internazionale Superiore di
Studi Avanzati (SISSA), Trieste, Italy, while additional control
experiments were carried out in Universidad de Valparaíso y
Universidad del Desarrollo, Chile (see below). The experiments
were performed according to the Declaration of Helsinki, and
approved by the SISSA bioethics committee.
Instruments
The DIG (Dictator-Investments Game)
The DIG, which we introduce here, combines the classical IG
(Berg et al., 1995) and DG (Forsythe et al., 1994) setups, based
on the experiments made by Cox (2004) (see also Ashraf et al.,
2006). We call P1 the trustor and P2 the trustee (as in a classical
IG). In our experiment the focus is on P2. P2 subjects performed
60 trials of a recurrent-interactions DIG. In each trial, subjects
played either an IG or a DG, which was decided using a pseudo-
random distribution programmed so that each player played 30
IG trials and 30 DG trials. In both scenarios, the initial maximum
amount of money available was equal to €12, and the exchange
factor was equal to 3 (see Figure 1 and above). The DIG trials
were divided into 3 blocks of 20 trials each. Participants were told
that they would play with 20 di erent P1s, located in a di erent
and dedicated room. Thus, they played three times with each P1
(once in each block), always in a random order, which prevented
reputation-building motives. After they completed the task, they
received an amount equal to the outcome of a random trial, plus
a €10-base. All allocations were computer simulations sending a
pseudo-random allocation drawn from a uniform distribution in
the range of [0, 12] €.
IG Trials
In the IG trials of the DIG, P2 began with €0. P1s then sent an
allocation A1 in the range [0, 12] €, which was multiplied by 3,
and given to P2. P2 then decided how much of the amount they
received (€3 ⇥ A1) to send back to the P1 they were paired with
in this trial. The allocation made by P2 (A2) is considered to
A B
FIGURE 1 | Experimental protocol. (A) Behavioral protocol. Schematic of the Dictator/Investment game (DIG) used here. Whether the subject faced a Dictator (DG;
open node) or an Investment (IG; closed node) condition was decided randomly with a probability of 0.5 for each. Subjects always played as P2. The payoff matrix is
at the bottom of the tree, with payoffs for P1 and P2 shown in the first and second row, respectively. (B) Flow of the game. Subjects played a total of 60 trials (in 3
blocks of 20 trials), consisting of 30 trials under the IG conditions (upper flow) and 30 trials under the DG conditions (lower flow). Trigger (vertical line) marks the
moment when the subject was notified that an allocation (A1) had been made. COM: computer; P1: player 1 (the trustor); P2: player 2 (the trustee).
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be an intentions-based allocation, given that the behavior of P2
would be influenced by the ascription of an intention to trust or
cooperate, signaled by the allocation A1 of the P1 (see Berg et al.,
1995; Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006).
DG Trials
In the DG trials of the DIG, P2 also began the game with €0.
Unlike the IG, however, P2 was told that the amount A1 (also
in the range of [0, 12] €) they received would be decided not
by P1, but a computer (COM). This amount was then multiplied
by 3 and given to P2. As in the IG, P2 then decided how much
of the amount they received (3 ⇥ A1 €) to send to the P1 they
were paired with in this trial. In this case, however, the allocation
made by the P2 (A2) is considered to be an outcome-based
allocation, given that their behavior would be influenced not by
the ascription of a cooperative intention of P1 (because P1 did not
decide howmuchCOM sent to P2), but by concerns regarding the
distribution of the total amount of money available.
Experimental Procedure
Behavioral Task
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in a
soundproof cabin. All electrical devices that could interfere with
EEG acquisition were turned o . Stimuli were presented using
the “Presentation” software1. In order to ensure that participants
understood the dynamics of the game, they first played three
practice trials of the DIG. Then, participants were left alone in
the room and began to play the DIG (see Figure 1).
Flow of the Game
The flow of theDIGwas as follows: In the first screen, participants
faced a short (3 s) video of 20 individuals, some of them entering
a room, to create the impression that the players would be
interacting with humans. After that, a screen asked subjects
to wait for the connection with the other participants to be
established, then asked them to press a key when they wanted
to begin the experiment. After that, a screen displayed a string
saying that the program was searching for another human
participant. Since subjects were in fact always playing with a
COM, this screen was displayed for a random duration between
1 and 10 s, until a screen indicated that the P1 was ready, thereby
giving the impression that the program was connecting via local
area network to the roomwith the chosen P1s.When the program
connected with the “human” partner, a screen displayed the ID of
the partner for 2 s (for instance: “P1: FW253”), then displayed
for 2 s a screen saying that the program was determining if the
player would receive an amount from the COM or from the
human partner. After that, a fixation cross was presented for a
random duration between 3.5 and 5 s. After the fixation time,
the screen indicated, for 3 s, if the participant was in a IG or
in a DG trial, following which it displayed for 3.5 s the initial
endowment of the players. Then, a screen asked participants how
much they expected from P1 or COM. If the trial was an IG, a
screen then displayed, for a random duration between 2 and 7 s
(to make participants believe that another human was making a
1www.neurobs.com
choice), a string notifying that P1 was sending an allocation. In
a DG, the screen immediately displayed for 2 s a string saying
that COM was sending a certain amount. After that, the fixation
cross was again displayed for between 3.5 and 5 s, after which
the amount that P1 or COM had sent was displayed for 3 s. If
A1 > €0, a screen asked the participant to send an amount to P1,
displaying a random amount between €0 and the total amount
available for the participant (€3 ⇥ A1), waiting for the subject
to use the buttons of the joystick to increase or decrease the
amount. This method was used to avoid inducing participants
to select a set amount (for instance, by always displaying €0
or the maximum available). A screen then showed the outcome
of the trial, both for the participant and for P1, and asked the
participant to press any key to continue to the next trial. When
A1 was equal to 0, the program switched directly to this screen.
After 20 trials, a screen indicated that the block had finished,
asking participants to press any key to continue to the next block.
When the third block finished, the program showed a screen
saying that the game was over and displayed the amount that the
participant earned, which was calculated as the amount earned in
one random trial from the 60 trials played by the subject, plus a
€10-base.
Analyses of Behavioral Data
Behavioral data were analyzed using the R software (R Core
Team, 2016). To test if the results were normally distributed, we
used the Shapiro-Wilk normality tests (R function shapiro.test).
The correlation between the subjects’ behavior in the IG and
the DG conditions was obtained using a Pearson correlation.
To analyze di erences between A2s under the IG versus
the DG conditions, we used a two-sided Mann-Whitney
test (R function wilcox.test), with a confidence interval of
95%. For this, we divided the trials into three categories
depending on the amount received by P2: when Â1 (i.e., A1
normalized as A1/T = A1/12) was less than 1/3, when Â1
was between 1/3 and 2/3, and when Â1 was greater than 2/3.
We then compared the subjects’ behavior in the IG and DG,
separately for each of the three categories, also using a 95%
confidence interval.
Regression analysis was performed using a Linear Mixed-
E ect Model, with error clusterized by subjects (R function lme).
We expressed the trustor’s response using the regression model:
Â2(t) = b0 + b1Â1(t) + b2Â1(t)IG(t) + b3IG(t) + b1Ê1(t)
+b2Ê1(t)IG(t) + +
where Â2(t) is the normalized amount subjects sent to P1
(A2/3A1; i.e., the amount P2 sent divided the total amount
available for this trial) in trial t, Â1 the normalized amount P2
received (A1/12), Ê1 the subjects’ first-order expectation (i.e., how
much they expected to receive), and IG is a dummy variable that
was given the value 1 when P2 was partnered with a “human” (IG
trials) and 0 when they were partnered with a COM (DG trials),
thus providing an interaction analysis reflecting the di erence
between DG and IG conditions. Given that expectations did not
have a significant b-value in our regression analyses, and that this
model specification presented the smaller log-likelihood value
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(see section “Results,” in particular Table 1), for the rest of the
analyses we used the model of Equation (1):
Â2(t) = b0 + b1Â1(t) + b2Â1(t)IG(t) + b3IG(t) (1)
Analyses of EEG Data
EEG Acquisition
EEGs were recorded continuously while participants played
the DIG. Recordings were made from an array of 128 silver-
chloride active electrodes mounted on an elastic cap, using
standard positioning (10-20 system). Reference electrodes were
placed on the left and right mastoids (A1/A2). EEG signals
were sampled at 1024 Hz, and amplified using an Active-
Two amplifier system (Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). The
ground reference consisted of two separate electrodes: Common
Mode Sense (CMS) active electrode and a Driven Right Leg
(DRL) passive electrode. Electrode sockets were filled with
conducting gel to increase signal quality. Electrode o set was kept
below 25 µV. An on-line analog low-pass acquisition filter was
set at 256 Hz. Data acquisition was made using the Actiview605-
Lores software2.
ERP Analysis
O ine EEG data analysis was performed using EEGLab
(Delorme andMakeig, 2004) and LANToolbox, a Matlab toolbox
built using algorithms implemented in Fieldtrip, EEGLab, and
Cronix, and specifically designed for advanced EEG signal
analyses3 (see, for example, our previous work: Billeke et al.,
2017a,b; Larrain-Valenzuela et al., 2017; Figueroa-Vargas et al.,
2020). EEG data for 3 of the 20 participants were excluded
because they had more than 40% of trials rejected, based on
semiautomatic criteria.
Preprocessing was made by applying a band-pass filter
between 0.1 and 100 Hz to the raw signal. Epochs were extracted
in the time range between [-1.5 and 1.5] s, centered on the time
when subjects were notified about the allocation they received
(A1). Eye-blinks were identified applying a threshold of 100 µV,
and removed using independent-component analysis (ICA) on
2www.biosemi.com
3http://neuroCICS.udd.cl/
the signal. Noisy trials were identified by visual inspection and
excluded. Signals were filtered using a low pass filter of 40 Hz,
and evoked activity was computed as the average signal recorded
at each electrode, for all the participants. Baseline was based on
the signal recorded [-0.3, -0.05] s. For visualization purposes, a
low-pass filter of 20 Hz was applied.
Source Estimation
For the estimation of cortical sources, electrode activity (first
referenced to mastoids electrodes) was re-referenced to the
average of all electrodes. A brain model taken from the
anatomy of a standard human brain was used to project
scalp activity onto the cortical surface (Montreal Neurology
Institute; MNI/Colin27). We defined 5000 cortical sources with
3 orthogonal dipoles each (thus, 3X sources). A three layer
conductivity model (brain, skull, and scalp) and a physical
forward model (Clerc et al., 2010) was calculated.
Source estimation was computed using an inverse solution
based on a weighted minimum norm estimate (wMNE), based
on Billeke et al. (2015), as implemented in Brainstorm software
(Tadel et al., 2011). Current source density time series for
each cortical source was computed with unrestrained dipole
orientation, for the average for each condition and for each
subject. The activity x ofN electrodes over time (t), X(t) = [x_1(t),
x_2(t),., x_n(t)], was assumed to be linearly correlated with a set
Y ofM cortical sources over time Y(t) = [y_1(t), y_2(t),., y_m(t)]
and with additive noise N(t): X(t) = LY(t) + N(t), where L is
the physical forward model. An inverse solution was derived as
Y(t) =MX(t) = RLT(LRLT + l 2C) – X(t), whereM is the inverse
operator, R is the source covariance, C the noise covariance,
and l a regulatory parameter, set to 1/3 (Lin et al., 2006). With
this, we obtained a time-series of the electrical activity for each
cortical source.
Statistical Analyses of EEG Data
For ERP analysis, we took the grand average ERP for all subjects
for the time epochs when they were notified about the amount A1,
and grouped them depending on whether they were measured
under the IG or the DG conditions. We compared, separately, the
results obtained under both conditions using Wilcoxon signed
TABLE 1 | Mixed-effect model for the regression of Â2 on the variables of interest (see Equation 1 and section “Methods”).
Main experiment | Control experiment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2
coef. p c.i. coef. p c.i. coef. p c.i.
bIntercept 0.157 0.001** [0.065 0.249] 0.162 0.000*** [0.095 0.229] 0.386 0.000*** [0.257 0.516]
bIG  0.105 0.093 [ 0.228 0.018]  0.111 0.008** [ 0.192  0.029]  0.240 0.02* [ 0.441  0.038]
bÂ1 0.060 0.217 [ 0.035 0.156] 0.060 0.215 [ 0.035 0.156]  0.251 0.124 [ 0.369 0.133]
bÂ1⇥IG 0.214 0.002** [0.081 0.346] 0.214 0.001** [0.082 0.346] 0.408 0.009** [0.102 0.714]
bÊ1 0.009 0.873 [ 0.098 0.116] - - - -
bÊ1⇥IG  0.009 0.899 [ 0.156 0.137] - - - -
Log-likelihood 86.39 90.41 98.12
Â1, amount subjects received; H, a dummy variable that is 0 for DG and 1 for IG. ⇤,⇤⇤ and ⇤⇤⇤ indicate statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001, respectively.
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rank test, as implemented in the LAN Toolbox. Signals were
projected onto a three-dimensional space, and the adjacent areas
with significant di erences in this space were corrected using
a cluster permutation test (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). We
defined the clusters as groups of adjacent points that showed the
same e ect, with a threshold of p < 0.05. In order to compare
the EEG activity obtained in trials when P2s received a high
versus low A1 feedback, we sorted the results depending on
whether A1 was greater or smaller than €6, then compared the
results from both groups for statistical di erences, under IG
and DG conditions.
EEG Activity and Behavioral Parameters
To investigate the relationship between a subject’s EEG activity
and the correlation between A2 and A1 (b-value in the regression
of Equation 1), we calculated, for each subject and separately
for the IG and the DG trials, the average frontomedial activity,
composed of activity from electrodes [C12, C13, C14, C19 (AFz),
C20, C21 (Fz), C25, C26, C27]. To assess the relationship between
b-values and a subject’s frontomedial activity, we specified two
separate models (R command lm), one for the IG and the other
for the DG trials, both of the form:
b(s) = g0 + g1FMA(s) + + (2)
where FMA(s) was the subject’s average frontomedial activity in
the time epoch when they were notified about A1, and b is the
estimated b-value of the regression of A2 on A1, calculated for
each subject (see Equation 1).
Control Experiments
In order to replicate themain behavioral results, and to determine
whether di erences in P2’s behavior could respond to di erences
in endowments of P1 between the IG versus the DG conditions,
we performed a control experiment, where the payo  structure in
DG trials was identical to that in the IG trials, the only di erence
being that subjects were instructed that the distribution in the DG
trials was made by COM, not by P1.
Participants
Fifty undergraduate students (mean age = 21.3 years;
s.d. = 3.7 years; min = 18 years; max = 26 years; 58% women)
were recruited both through direct contact and via a mailing
list. The control experiments were carried out during a first
session at the Computer Labs of the Escuela de Psicología,
Universidad de Valparaíso (UV) and during a second session
at the Computer Labs of the Escuela de Medicina, Universidad
del Desarrollo (UDD), Chile. Participants were paid CLP $5000
(about €6.5) base plus the amount they received in the game. The
experimental procedures were the same as those described in the
Main Experiment, with the following di erences:
Instruments
Subjects performed one block of 20 trials of a recursive
interactions DIG. Participants were told that they would play
with 20 di erent P1s located in a di erent room of the
corresponding facility. Thus, they played once with each P1.
As in the Main Experiment, all P1 and COM allocations were
computer simulations, sending a random allocation of tokens
drawn from a uniform distribution in [0, 12], with each unit
corresponding to CLP $500.
DG Trials
In these trials P1s received an allocation equal to the amount that
COM did not send to P2. This meant that the payo  structure in
DG trials was identical to that of the IG trials, the only di erence
being that subjects were instructed that the distribution in the
DG trials was made by COM, not by P1. This setup served to
determine whether di erences in the endowments of P1 and P2
could modify P2’s behavior.
Experimental Procedure
Participants only performed the behavioral task; no EEG
recordings were made. Stimuli were presented using the
Psychopy software (Peirce, 2009). The stimuli presentation
protocol was the same as that used in the Main Experiment,
except that it did not display the screen with the fixation cross.
RESULTS
On average, subjects (P2s) reciprocated (to P1s) an allocation Â2
(A2/3A1; see Methods) of similar magnitude under the DG and
IG conditions of the DIG (average for DG: 0.19; median: 0.17;
s.d.: 0.17; average for IG: 0.21; median: 0.18; s.d.: 0.19; p = 0.39,
W = 160860; Mann-Whitney test) (Figure 2A). Interestingly, we
found a strong correlation between a given subject’s behavior in
the DG and their behavior in the IG (r = 0.72; t = 4.36; p = 0.0004;
Pearson correlation) (Figure 2B).
To understand how subjects repay trust under outcome-
based versus intention-based conditions, we regressed subjects’
Â2s on the Ê1s and Â1s they received under the DG versus
the IG conditions of the DIG (Equation 1). Under the DG
condition we found that subjects sent the same proportion
of their endowment to P1, regardless of the amount P2s
received (bÂ1 = 0.060; p = 0.215; c.i. = [-0.035, 0.156])
(Figure 2C and Table 1). In contrast, under the IG condition we
obtained a significant and positive value for b (bÂ1⇥IG = 0.214;
p = 0.001; c.i. = [0.082, 0.346]). Thus, this dependence of
A2 on A1 is specific to intention-based behaviors. We did
not find significant associations between subjects’ first-order
expectations (Ê1) and behavior, neither for the outcome- nor
the intention-based conditions (for instance, bÊ1⇥IG =  0.009;
p = 0.899; c.i. = [ 0.156, 0.137]; see Table 1). In addition,
the regression model including expectations showed a smaller
log-likelihood value as compared to the model of Equation (1)
(see Table 1).
We next tested for the existence of regions in which negative
and positive reciprocity could be observed. We defined these
regions as investment ranges in which subjects playing in the IG
condition would send amounts smaller or greater than what they
would send under the DG condition, respectively (see section
“Methods”). Wilcoxon tests revealed significant di erences when
Â1 was in the [0, 1/3] range (W = 6818.5; p = 5.16 ⇥ 10 6;
di erence in location =  4.17 ⇥ 10 5) and in the [2/3, 1] range
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of allocations made under the DG and the IG conditions. (A) Barplot of allocations made under DG (white) and IG (black) conditions. No
significant differences were found when we considered the allocations made over the entire range of possible endowments. (B) Scatterplot of mean individual
allocations (open circles) under the DG (X-axis) versus the IG (Y-axis) conditions; black line corresponds to the Pearson correlation (r = 0.72; p = 0.0004). Areas of
positive and negative reciprocity as a function of the amount received. (C) Participants’ normalized allocations as a function of the normalized amount they received
(X-axis). Lines represent the linear regression of Â2 on Â1 (see Equation 1) under IG (solid line) and DG (dashed line) conditions. (D) Bar plot showing the mean
allocations made by subjects (Y-axis) under the IG (black bars) and DG (white bars) conditions, for different levels of received trust (X-axis); low: Â1 < 1/3; mid:
1/3 = < Â1 < 2/3; and high: Â1 > = 2/3. **indicates p < 0.01.
(W = 35656, p = 1.23 ⇥ 10 8; di erence in location = 0.083),
failing to show a di erence in location for Â1 in the (1/3, 2/3)
range (W = 18382, p = 0.49). Thus, the DIG setup allowed
us to unmask three di erent behaviors: (i) negative reciprocity,
where the amount subjects sent was lower in the IG than in the
DG; (ii) an area where the behavior of subjects playing IG and
DG was indistinguishable; and (iii) positive reciprocity, where
the amount subjects sent was higher in the IG than in the DG
(see Figures 2C,D).
The results in the control experiments were consistent with
our previous findings, namely that the subjects’ allocation, Â2,
depended on the amount received by P2 only under the IG,
and not under the DG condition (bÂ1 =  0.251; p = 0.124;
bÂ1⇥IG = 0.408; p = 0.009; three subjects were excluded from
this analysis because they used a strictly self-interested strategy
in more than 80% of the trials). In addition, the values for the
dummy variable also supports the existence of regions of negative
and positive reciprocity (dummy variable for the IG condition:
bIG =  0.240; p = 0.02) (See Table 1).
We next analyzed the ERPs of subjects centered on epochs
in the range between [ 0.5, 1] s relative to when they were
notified about the allocation A1 they received. We found a
significant modulation between 560 and 680 ms after stimulus
presentation (p < 0.01; cluster-based permutation test; cluster
threshold detection: p < 0.05; Wilcoxon test paired samples) in
a frontomedial ROI of electrodes (a priori selection, see section
“Methods”). Specifically, subjects displayed a more prominent
frontal negativity when they were notified about A1 in the
DG versus the IG condition (see Figure 3A). Estimations of
the cortical sources of these di erences projected to the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the left anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
(p < 0.01; uncorrected; FDR: q = 0.05, Figure 3B).
We next focused specifically on the results obtained under the
outcome-based (DG) condition. As the frontomedial negativity
was more prominent when subjects were notified about A1
in the DG trials, we hypothesized that the magnitude of the
received endowment might modulate this potential. For this,
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FIGURE 3 | Frontomedial negativity (FMN) is greater under DG condition than under IG condition when subjects are notified about the allocation they will receive
(A1). (A) Left: ERPs amplitude (Y-axis) of subjects when they received an allocation from a human (blue lines) versus a COM (red lines). Statistically significant
differences occurred between 550 and 680 ms (X-axis) after stimulus onset. Right: Scalp potentials distribution. (B) Cortical source projections (FDR: q < 0.05;
p < 0.01, uncorrected). *indicates p < 0.05.
we divided the trials depending on whether A1 was above or
below the median of the range of A1 (A1 = €6). We found
significant di erences between conditions (p < 0.01; cluster-
based permutation test; cluster threshold detection: p < 0.05;
Wilcoxon test paired samples), with ERPs for trials in which
subjects received an A1 > €6 being associated with more
negative frontomedial activity, as compared to the ERPs for
trials in which A1 < €6. No such di erences were found
for IG trials (Figure 4A). Thus, the amplitude of the frontal
negativity depended on the magnitude of the amount that
subjects received specifically in the outcomes-based conditions.
Cortical projections suggest that the right DLPFCwas the cortical
source of this di erence in ERPs (p < 0.01; uncorrected; FDR:
q < 0.05, Figure 4B).
Finally, we focused on the frontomedial negativity that
subjects displayed in the IG trials. We explored whether the
individual’s mean potentials in the frontomedial ROI between
560 and 680 ms after stimulus onset could be predictive of
the subject’s behavior, specifically how subjects responded to an
additional unit of trust (i.e., the values of bÂ1⇥IG in the regression
of Â2 on Â1; see Equation 1 and above). Our analyses revealed
a significant correlation between both variables (g1 =  0.038;
p = 0.046; see Equation 2), showing that subjects with more
negative values in this frontomedial cluster presented greater
b-values in the behavioral regression (Figure 4C), thus predicting
how subjects responded to trust. We did not observe this
association for the DG condition (g1 = 0.003; p = 0.8; seeTable 2).
Cortical source estimations of the coe cients of this regression
also projected to the left DLPFC (p < 0.01; uncorrected; FDR:
q < 0.05, Figure 4D).
DISCUSSION
Here we combined electroencephalography and two canonical
behavioral economic games to investigate a subject’s behavior and
neurophysiological activity in contexts that called for an altruistic
response—which requires only concerns about outcome, versus
a reciprocal one—which requires concerns about both outcomes
and intentions.
We directly compared these two responses by devising a
mixed Dictator-Investment game, and contrasting the amount
subjects sent in an intention-based condition (the Investments
game trials, IG) with the amount that the same subject sent
back under an outcome-based condition (the Dictator game
trials, DG). We found that subjects displayed other-regarding
behaviors, allocating amounts greater than €0 most of the time.
In addition, a subject’s behavior depended on which game they
were playing. Indeed, we found that only under the intentions-
based condition the proportion of the endowment sent increased
when the subject received greater allocations, suggesting that
the ascription of intention was responsible for the di erences
in behavior. In addition, we found a strong correlation between
a subject’s behavior in both games, also previously reported
between the DG and the Prisoner’s dilemma (Capraro et al.,
2014). This phenomena is consistent with the findings on
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A B
C D
FIGURE 4 | Frontomedial negativity encodes the magnitude of A1 under the DG condition. (A) Left: ERPs of subjects when they received an allocation in the IG. Blue
and black lines represent subjects’ ERP when values of A1 were above and below €6, respectively. Right: ERPs of subjects for the DG condition. Red and black lines
represent subjects’ ERP when values of A1 were above and below €6, respectively. Significant differences were obtained in a time windows between 550 and
650 ms after stimulus onset, specifically for this condition. (B) Cortical source projections (FDR: q < 0.05; p < 0.01, uncorrected). *indicates p < 0.05. Subjects’
average FMN predicts their responses to trust: (C) Regression of average ERPs in the frontomedial cluster (X-axis) versus the b-values obtained from Equation 1
(Y-axis) for the IG (intentions-based) condition (g1 = -0.037; p = 0.045). (D) Cortical source projections (FDR: q < 0.01; p < 0.005, uncorrected).
cooperative phenotypes (Capraro et al., 2014; Peysakhovich et al.,
2014) and moral preferences (Capraro and Rand, 2018).
However our sample size is small (and would be useful to
replicate these results with a bigger sample), our results extend
those from previous reports, in which subjects’ altruism and
reciprocity were compared only for specific values of endowment
(for outcomes-based conditions) or received trust (for intentions-
based conditions) (i.e., Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006). By
TABLE 2 | Linear model for the regression of subjects’ frontomedial activity on the
individuals’ predicted b of the behavioral regression (see Equations 1 and 2).
DG IG
Coef. p c.i coef. p c.i
bFMA 0.003 0.8 [ 0.016 0.018]  0.038 0.046* [ 0.075  0.012]
FMA, subjects frontomedial activity. ⇤ indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
testing how the same subject behaved over a whole range
of possible endowments, our results allow us to distinguish
three di erent phenomena: (i) the previously reported positive
reciprocity (McCabe et al., 2003; Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006),
for high amount of received trust; (ii) an area where altruism and
reciprocity were indistinguishable; and (iii) an area of negative
reciprocity, for low levels of trust. Thus, we found that reciprocity
is positive only for high amounts of trust, but turns negative (i.e.,
is less than expected for altruism) for lower amounts.
Positive reciprocity has been discussed elsewhere (McCabe
et al., 2003; Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006). Negative reciprocity
could be interpreted as indicating that subjects feel social betrayal
if the amount of trust received is less than what they expect
from a certain social norm of expected trust (Gouldner, 1960;
Coleman, 2000). Similarly, in the Ultimatum Game subjects have
been reported to reject an o er (even at a cost to themselves) if
they think it is unfair (Güth et al., 1982; Sanfey et al., 2003; Billeke
et al., 2013, 2014, 2015; Kaltwasser et al., 2016). Similarly, in the
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Public good games with altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter,
2002), subjects incur a cost to punish free-riders. A crucial
di erence with the negative reciprocity reported here is that,
in our experimental setting, subjects do not lose money when
punishing a (perceived) unfair treatment—instead, they earn
a greater amount.
At the neurobiological level, a late frontal negativity was more
negative when subjects were notified about the amount they had
to share in the outcome- versus the intention-based condition.
Cortical source estimations for the ERP di erences projected
to ACC, DLPFC, and TPJ, brain regions which participate in
mentalization and cognitive control networks. ACC participates
in cognitive control processes in both social (Apps and Ramnani,
2014; Apps et al., 2016) and non-social (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Shenhav et al., 2013, 2016; Hauser et al., 2014; Ullsperger
et al., 2014; Kolling et al., 2016) scenarios. ACC has also
been associated with the maintenance of trust and reciprocal
interactions (King-Casas et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008)
and its activity is modulated by the “prosocial” neuropeptide
oxytocin (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Aspé-Sánchez et al., 2016).
In addition, theta activity projecting to ACC might reflect a
behavioral heuristic adaptation to the behavior of others (Billeke
et al., 2014). TPJ has been shown to be important in the control
of selfish impulses (Hutcherson et al., 2015) and the valuation
of others’ outcomes (Hutcherson et al., 2015; Hein et al., 2016).
During social interactions, TPJ alpha activity correlated with
the anticipation of the other’s behavior, and with the use of
mentalization in planning future actions (Billeke et al., 2013,
2015; Melloni et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2017; Soto-Icaza et al., 2019).
DLPFC, on the other hand, is involved in strategic and normative
decision making (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2011;
Yamagishi et al., 2016), and when matching the other player’s
expectations about a social interaction (Chang et al., 2011).
We found that under the outcome-based trials this late frontal
negativity was more negative when subjects received greater
allocations, with scalp activity projecting to the DLPFC. In this
respect, two studies have found that a dictator’s unfair o er
elicits, in the recipients, a more negative ERP (specifically a
feedback-related negativity) than does a fair o er (Wu et al.,
2011)—even in the third-person version of the game (i.e.,
when subjects observe others receiving the allocation; Mothes
et al., 2016). In contrast, here subjects processed the allocations
received in the outcomes-based condition not as recipients, but
as dictators, with greater allocations from the COM implying
a greater endowment to choose to share with their human
partner. Since greater frontal negativity was observed when
subjects received high versus low amounts, it is possible that
subjects recruited more cognitive control in order to inhibit the
impulse to be selfish—similar to situations in which feedback-
related negativity amplitude indicates more cognitive control
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ullsperger et al., 2014). Indeed, EEG
signals from both ERP and theta activity projecting to DLFC
correlate with cognitive control during development (Zamorano
et al., 2020). Consistent with this interpretation, the associated
activity projected to structures involved in the normative network
(specifically, DLPFC), arguably participating in the process of
overriding a subjects’ temptations to keep a greater amount
for themselves (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2011;
Yamagishi et al., 2016).
There exists extensive evidence involving the MFN in
the evaluation of outcomes far from expectations, in both
probabilistic and social tasks (i.e., reward prediction error)
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Potts et al., 2006; Eppinger et al.,
2008; Martin and Potts, 2011; Billeke et al., 2013). In addition
to reward evaluation, the MFN is involved in processes that
influence future decisions and learning (Eppinger et al., 2008;
Billeke et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016; Zhong et al., 2019),
being relevant in social tasks where the outcome evaluations
are not the final resource allocation of the game. For example,
for the same o er evaluation, subjects playing the Ultimatum
game show a greater MFN than that they show in the DG
(Zhong et al., 2019). In the present experiment, we found a
larger MFN for higher o ers under the DG condition, which is
contrary to the prediction given by reward expectation (Boksem
and de Cremer, 2010). However, this result could be interpreted
as indicating positive inequity aversion: evidence shows that
subjects in the role of proposers display greater MFN evoked by
an unfair (but advantageous) outcome distribution than if they
have the choice tomake a fair (but not advantageous) distribution
(Wang et al., 2016).
Interestingly, these e ects did not occur under IG. Under
this condition, FMN did not show a modulation related to the
initial endowment, but was modulated by the prosocial decision
that followed. This might occur because reciprocal behavior is
more common in nature (Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Franzen
and Pointner, 2013): we trust and repay trust from conspecifics
everyday, so this outcome requires less cognitive control. An
additional—and complementary—interpretation could be that
allocations under intentions-based conditions are processed in
a more heuristic fashion. Much research has indicated that,
in social dilemmas, subjects apply di erent rules (heuristics)
without necessarily recruiting neurophysiological markers of
cognitive control (Billeke et al., 2014; Yamagishi et al., 2016; Hill
et al., 2017; For a review, see Capraro, 2019). Interestingly, these
di erent rules that subjects apply correlate with activity in medial
prefrontal regions, the DLPFC and the TPJ (Billeke et al., 2014;
Melloni et al., 2016; San Martín et al., 2016; Yamagishi et al.,
2016; Hill et al., 2017). The use of a heuristic strategy in our
experiments is supported by the fact that the subject’s average
ERP amplitudes showed a significant negative correlation with
how much they increased (decreased) their reciprocity when
facing more (less) trust. This correlation projects to the DLPFC,
which suggests the use of normative rules (Lim et al., 2016).
Neurophysiologically, negative reciprocity has previously been
investigated only in association with the rejection of unfair o ers
in the Ultimatum game, in which brain areas related to cognitive
control and normative decision-making (such as the DLPFC)
correlate with the rejection of unfair o ers (Sanfey et al., 2003).
Our results suggest that DLPFC activity is associated with the
observed behavior in complex social interactions, such as those
requiring reciprocity. A final interpretation could be that subjects
with more pronounced FMN activity manifest an increase
in negative reciprocity. Indeed, evidence shows that FMN
activity correlates with the negative reciprocity displayed by the
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subject in the Ultimatum game, especially for high/fair o ers
(Kaltwasser et al., 2016).
In summary, the use of the hybrid DIG revealed that reciprocal
behavior is positive for high amounts of received trust, but
negative for low amounts. In addition, altruism and reciprocity
evoke di erent activity in brain networks involved in mentalizing
and cognitive control, which are involved in the inhibition
of selfish behavior, and the processing of the internal states,
the perspectives, and even the monitoring of the performance
of others, such as during (vicarious) reward prediction errors
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; Apps et al., 2016; Wittmann et al.,
2016). Thus, our findings expand our current knowledge about
the relationship between brain networks involved in mentalizing
and cognitive control processes, social preferences, and complex
social behaviors.
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